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Sarah-jane Nussbaum*  Critique-Inspired Pedagogies in 
 Canadian Criminal Law Casebooks:
 Challenging “Doctrine First, Critique
 Second” Approaches to First-Year
 Law Teaching
This article is a critical evaluation of Canadian criminal law casebooks. The 
author explores the aims, practices, and challenges of these teaching texts by 
examining their relationship to critique-inspired pedagogical methods. A number 
of English-language Canadian criminal law casebooks add a welcome feature 
to the Canadian common law teaching landscape: all but one of six recently 
published casebooks teach doctrine and critique together. The research builds on 
an emerging scholarship of Canadian legal education by demonstrating evidence 
of critical political commitments and critique-inspired teaching methods within 
Canadian criminal law education. Yet casebook editors and other professors who 
utilize critical methods acknowledge challenges of teaching doctrine from critical 
standpoints. These discoveries lead the author to suggest that emphasizing the 
goals of teaching critique, including producing more effective lawyers and creating 
learning environments that value student diversity, will be helpful for moving 
forward with critique-inspired teaching.
Dans le présent article, l’auteure présente une évaluation critique des recueils de 
jurisprudence en droit pénal canadien. Elle explore les objectifs, les pratiques et 
les défis que comportent ces textes d’enseignement en examinant leur relation 
avec les méthodes pédagogiques inspirées de la critique. Un certain nombre de 
recueils de jurisprudence en droit pénal canadien de langue anglaise ajoutent 
une caractéristique bienvenue au paysage de l’enseignement de la common 
law au Canada : tous les recueils de jurisprudence récemment publiés, sauf un, 
enseignent la doctrine et la critique ensemble. La recherche s’appuie sur une 
nouvelle étude de l’enseignement du droit au Canada en démontrant l’existence 
d’engagements politiques critiques et de méthodes d’enseignement inspirées de 
la critique dans l’enseignement du droit pénal au Canada. Pourtant, les éditeurs 
de recueils de jurisprudence et d’autres professeurs qui utilisent des méthodes 
critiques reconnaissent les défis de l’enseignement de la doctrine à partir de points 
de vue critiques. Ces découvertes amènent l’auteure à suggérer que l’accent mis 
sur les objectifs de l’enseignement de la critique, y compris la production d’avocats 
plus efficaces et la création de milieux d’apprentissage qui valorisent la diversité 
des étudiants, sera utile pour aller de l’avant avec un enseignement inspiré de la 
critique.
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Introduction
I. Critique-inspired pedagogies: Aiming to enhance and broaden legal 
skills and aiming to effectively teach diverse students
II. Doctrine-first teaching in English-language Canadian criminal law 
casebooks
1. “This casebook deals primarily with general principles of 
criminal law and with defences”: Schmeiser
2. “Our students need to be informed before they can be truly 
critical”: Stuart
III. Critique-inspired teaching in English-language Canadian Criminal 
Law casebooks
1. Towards a critique-inspired approach: Criminal Law’s contexts 
in Friedland/Roach
2. “Critically examining the traditional approach to criminal law”: 
Saunders
3. Beginning with “people’s lives”: Pickard
4. “Relations of power”: Abell
Conclusions: The challenge of pursuing critique-inspired teaching 
instead of doctrine-first teaching
Introduction
“A tension exists between the need to deliver an understanding of legal 
doctrine and theory, along with traditional lawyering skills, and the 
parallel obligation to engage students in the critical analysis of those 
rules and skills.” – Julia Tolmie1 
In common-law law schools, professors portray law teaching as involving 
two competing demands—teaching doctrine and teaching critique.2 
Teaching doctrine has come to stand for the practice of teaching a narrow 
conception of law by focusing on the legal rules and reasoning that emanate 
1. Julia Tolmie, “Introducing Feminist Legal Jurisprudence Through the Teaching of Criminal Law” 
in Kris Gledhill & Ben Livings, eds, The Teaching of Criminal Law: The Pedagogical Imperatives 
(New York: Routledge, 2017) 173 at 175. 
2. See e.g. ibid; Okianer Christian Dark, “Incorporating Issues of Race, Gender, Class, Sexual 
Orientation, and Disability into Law School Teaching” (1996) 32:3 Willamette L Rev 541 at 551; 
David Sandomierski, Aspiration and Reality in Legal Education (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2020) [Sandomierski, Aspiration and Reality].
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from case law. Scholars describe doctrine-focused teaching as formalist 
and affiliate it with Harvard Law School professor and dean, Christopher 
Columbus Langdell.3 Langdell is regarded as having written the first 
casebook, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts, in 1871.4 In it, 
Langdell claims that using cases is the most effective way “of mastering 
the doctrine”: 
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines…
Each of these doctrines has arrived at its present state by slow degrees; 
in other words, it is a growth, extending in many cases through centuries. 
This growth is to be traced in the main through a series of cases; and 
much the shortest and best, if not the only way of mastering the doctrine 
effectually is by studying the cases in which it is embodied.5
The formalist, or case method, approach to teaching doctrine captures the 
idea that judicial cases contain rules that can be studied and applied on 
their own, without concern for the social contexts from which they emerge 
or for their broader social consequences.6 
By comparison, teaching critique is the practice of teaching perspectives 
and skills that challenge doctrine’s claims to logic and justice. Teaching 
critique recognizes that: judicial analysis leaves out lots of perspectives, 
experiences and other laws and often further marginalizes people who live 
in contexts of oppression. Judicial analysis thus does not always provide 
sufficient or appropriate resources for dealing with the problems that law 
confronts. Teaching critique can identify, emphasize, and contest the 
violence and oppression that doctrine (re)produces. Scholars align these 
practices with teaching students how to promote the needs and interests 
of vulnerable, marginalized, and oppressed communities and individuals.7 
These approaches reflect the political and academic commitments of 
3. See e.g. Elizabeth Mertz, The Language of Law School: Learning to “Think Like a Lawyer” 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 26; Sandomierski, Aspiration and Reality, supra note 2 at 
44.
4. Christopher Columbus Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts: With References 
and Citations, prepared for Use as a Text-Book in Harvard Law School (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 
1871).
5. Ibid at vi.
6. Sandomierski, Aspiration and Reality, supra note 2 at 45.
7. See generally e.g. Dark, supra note 2; Deborah Zalesne, “Racial Inequality in Contracting: 
Teaching Race as a Core Value” (2013) 3:1 Colum J of Race & L 23; Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, 
“Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education” (1994) 4:1 S Cal Rev L & 
Women’s Stud 33; Arlene S Kanter, “The Law: What’s Disability Studies Got to Do With It or an 
Introduction to Disability Legal Studies” (2011) 42:2 Colum HRLR 403; Khylee Quince, “Teaching 
Indigenous and Minority Students and Perspectives in Criminal Law” in Kris Gledhill & Ben Livings, 
eds, The Teaching of Criminal Law: The Pedagogical Imperatives (New York: Routledge, 2017) 162; 
Tolmie, supra note 1. 
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critical legal studies, which seeks to unveil the political nature of law and 
transform it for the betterment of oppressed individuals and groups,8 of 
law and society, or sociolegal, studies, which brings methodologies and 
insights from the social sciences into the study of law,9 and of scholars 
who seek to respond to calls to Indigenize the law school curriculum.10
This article is a critical evaluation of Canadian criminal law casebooks. 
I explore the aims, practices, and challenges of these teaching texts by 
examining their relationship to doctrinal and critical methods. The article 
is rooted in the idea that casebooks provide insight into how law students 
are taught to “think…about law and legal practice.”11 The research 
also builds on an emerging scholarship of Canadian legal education. In 
particular, it expands on the insights in David Sandomierski’s recent book, 
which shows that Canadian common law contracts professors demonstrate 
a preference for teaching “doctrine first, critique second”12—specifically, 
a preference for teaching judicial reasoning first and critiques of that 
reasoning second.13 As Sandomierski argues, these approaches convey the 
ideas that judicial reasoning “has a comprehensible, identifiable, distinctive 
core” and “that subjecting the core to critique is not particularly important, 
or at least not of equal importance to communicating that core.”14 Yet, 
despite the overwhelming practice of teaching doctrine before critique, 
Sandomierski also found that many contract law professors nevertheless 
identified value in teaching critique and aspired to do so.15 In particular, 
Sandomierski found that most contract law professors do not teach much 
critique in practice. However, their reasons for nonetheless desiring to 
teach theory and critical perspectives are generally “instrumental and 
practical” in nature: teaching theory and critical perspectives equips 
students to become “‘better lawyers.’”16 
In this article, I illuminate the ways in which English-language criminal 
law casebook editors in Canada have taken up the challenge of working 
8. See Sandomierski, Aspiration and Reality, supra note 2 at 60-61.
9. See Kanter, supra note 7 at 442.
10. On the meanings of, and differences between, Indigenizing and decolonizing law schools, see 
Jeffery G Hewitt, “Decolonizing and Indigenizing: Some Considerations for Law Schools” (2016) 
33:1 Windsor YB Access Just 65. 
11. Janet Ainsworth, “Law in (Case)books, Law (School) in Action: The Case for Casebook Reviews” 
(1997) 20:2 Seattle UL Rev 271 at 275. See also David Sandomierski, “Tension and Reconciliation 
in Canadian Contract Law Casebooks” (2017) 54:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 1181 [Sandomierski, “Canadian 
Contract Law Casebooks”]. 
12. Sandomierski, Aspiration and Reality, supra note 2 at 240.
13. Ibid at 240-244.
14. Ibid at 240.
15. Ibid, ch 4, 5.
16. Ibid at 38.
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against the grain as all but one17 of six recently published casebooks teach 
doctrine and critique together.18 I use the term critique-inspired pedagogies 
to capture the alternative teaching method—engaging with doctrine from 
critical standpoints. 
I take the position that critique-inspired approaches are preferable 
to doctrine-first approaches, drawing on the arguments presented in 
scholarship on teaching minority, feminist, Indigenous, class, disability, 
and critical race perspectives in legal education. Specifically, this body 
of literature identifies two compelling overarching objectives of critique-
inspired teaching. First, consistent with Sandomierski’s findings, critique-
inspired teaching aims to equip law students with skills to be “better 
lawyers”19—to be aware of, and responsive towards, diverse experiences 
and oppressive legal structures. Critique-inspired approaches are 
intimately connected with social justice goals that aim to teach students 
about eradicating inequalities and oppression and about the challenges of, 
and possible pathways for, working towards those goals. Second, critique-
inspired teaching aims to create learning environments that value student 
diversity.20 
I turn first to the goals of critique-inspired teaching and then conduct 
a textual analysis of English-language Canadian criminal law casebooks.21 
My main interest lies in studying 21st century casebooks. However, I 
17. Don Stuart & Steve Coughlan, Learning Canadian Criminal Law, 14th ed (Toronto: Thomson 
Reuters Canada, 2018) [Stuart]. When this article was already at the proof stage, a new edition of 
Stuart was published (Don Stuart & Steve Coughlan, Learning Canadian Criminal Law, 15th ed 
(Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada, 2021)). Regrettably, I have not had the opportunity to incorporate 
the 2021 edition into this article.  
18. See Kent Roach et al, Criminal Law and Procedure: Cases and Materials, 11th ed (Toronto: 
Emond, 2020) [Roach]; RP Saunders & Rebecca Bromwich, Criminal Law in Canada: An 
Introduction to the Theoretical, Social and Legal Contexts, 5th ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2016) 
[Saunders]; Toni Pickard et al, Dimensions of Criminal Law, 3d ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 
2002) [Pickard]; Jennie Abell, Elizabeth Sheehy & Natasha Bakht, Criminal Law & Procedure: Cases, 
Context, Critique, 5th ed (Concord: Captus Press, 2012) [Abell, Volume I]; Jennie Abell, Elizabeth 
Sheehy & Natasha Bakht, Criminal Law & Procedure: Proof, Defences, and Beyond, 5th ed (Concord: 
Captus Press, 2014) [Abell, Volume II].
19. Zalesne, supra note 7 at 27; Kanter, supra note 7 at 405.
20. Crenshaw, supra note 7; Quince, supra note 7; Zalesne, supra note 7 at 46-47; Charles R 
Calleros, “Training a Diverse Student Body for a Multicultural Society” (1995) 8 La Raza LJ 140 
at 144-45; Alice K Dueker, “Diversity and Learning: Imagining a Pedagogy of Difference” (1991) 
19:1 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 101 at 111-120; Susan Bisom-Rapp, “Contextualizing the Debate: 
How Feminist and Critical Race Scholarship Can Inform the Teaching of Employment Discrimination 
Law” (1994) 44:3 J Leg Educ 366 at 369.
21. I focus on published English-language Canadian criminal law casebooks. Excluded from my 
study are textbooks that exclusively aim to teach criminal law to students who do not plan to become 
lawyers: see for example, Simon N Verdun-Jones, Criminal Law in Canada: Cases, Questions, and 
the Code, 5th ed (Toronto: Nelson Education, 2011) at x. I also excluded criminal law textbooks and 
bound course materials.
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provide historical context by examining the first English-language criminal 
law casebooks that were published in Canada in the 1960s: Douglas 
Schmeiser’s Cases and Comments on Criminal Law (Schmeiser)22; and 
Martin Friedland’s Cases and Materials on Criminal Law and Procedure 
(Friedland).23 These two casebooks fall into different categories, with 
Schmeiser representing a doctrine-first pedagogy and Friedland moving 
towards critique-inspired teaching. The books demonstrate that both 
doctrine-first and critique-inspired pedagogies have been part of English-
language Canadian criminal law casebooks since their introduction in the 
1960s. For the remaining casebooks, I focus primarily on their most recent 
editions. 
My casebook analysis begins with casebooks that have adopted 
“doctrine first, critique second” approaches to criminal law teaching: 
Schmeiser and Don Stuart and Steve Coughlan’s Learning Canadian 
Criminal Law, most recently published in 2018 (Stuart).24 I then consider 
casebooks that have moved towards and employed critique-inspired 
approaches: Friedland and the most recent version of Friedland, published 
in 2020 and now under the editorship of Kent Roach, Benjamin Berger, 
Emma Cunliffe, and Asad Kiyani (Roach)25; RP Saunders and Rebecca 
Bromwich’s Criminal Law in Canada: An Introduction to the Theoretical, 
Social and Legal Contexts, most recently published in 2016 (Saunders)26; 
Toni Pickard, Phil Goldman, Renate Mohr, and Rosemary Cairns-Way’s 
Dimensions of Criminal Law, most recently published in 2002 (Pickard)27; 
and Jennie Abell, Elizabeth Sheehy, and Natasha Bakht’s two-volume 
casebook collection, Criminal Law & Procedure, most recently published 
in 2012 (Abell Volume 1)28 and 2014 (Abell Volume 2).29
I analyze each casebook’s conception of the relationship between 
doctrine and critique in teaching criminal law. I do so by discussing the 
books’ prefaces or introductions, materials that are particularly emblematic 
of each book’s approach to teaching doctrine and critique, and each book’s 
section on the law surrounding the defence of not criminally responsible 
22. Douglas A Schmeiser, Cases and Comments on Criminal Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1966) 
[Schmeiser].
23. See Martin Friedland, Cases and Materials on Criminal Law and Procedure, 2d ed (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1968) [Friedland]. 
24. Stuart, supra note 17.
25. Roach, supra note 18.
26. Saunders, supra note 18.
27. Pickard, supra note 18. Cairns-Way was the primary editor of the third edition (see ibid at v). 
However, for consistency with its earlier editions, I refer to the casebook as Pickard throughout.
28. Abell, Volume I, supra note 18.
29. Abell, Volume II, supra note 18.
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on account of mental disorder. I chose to use the mental disorder defence 
as a point of comparison between casebooks because the defence is an area 
of criminal law doctrine that illuminates “foundational issues—concerning 
criminal responsibility and subjectivity—which go to the core of criminal 
law.”30 Casebooks that place a priority on teaching critique alongside 
doctrine employ critique-inspired pedagogies including: teaching criminal 
law within its political, institutional, and social contexts; demonstrating 
the relevance of lived experience to criminal law; illuminating the power 
relations embedded within criminal law; and showing both the possibilities 
and substantial limitations of achieving social justice goals (such as gender 
equality, anti-racism, and equality for people living with disabilities) 
through Canadian criminal law. 
My findings are modest. The prevalence of critique-inspired 
approaches in English-language Canadian criminal law casebooks does not 
tell us which books are used most frequently in classrooms, and, perhaps 
more importantly, my research does not tell us how these books are, or 
have been, used or what messages students take from them. Instead, my 
research makes the more preliminary point that further inquiry into these 
types of questions would be well warranted. The criminal law casebooks 
show that several English-language Canadian criminal law casebook 
editors have endeavoured to achieve the aspiration, which many contract 
law professors also share, of creating better lawyers. However, despite 
the availability of critique-inspired approaches, they nonetheless appear 
to occupy the margins of Canadian common law teaching. Casebook 
editors and other scholars have acknowledged the challenge of adopting 
teaching methods and philosophies that go against students’, colleagues’, 
and lawyers’ expectations for doctrine-first teaching. This challenge 
leads me to suggest that emphasizing and further exploring the goals of 
teaching critique will be helpful for moving forward with critique-inspired 
pedagogies. 
I. Critique-inspired pedagogies: Aiming to enhance and broaden legal 
skills and aiming to effectively teach diverse students
Critique-inspired pedagogies involve inserting considerations of identities, 
oppression, and power relations into doctrinal legal education on a 
continuous basis. Scholars compare this practice to approaches that involve 
addressing such considerations only in “specialty or seminar courses,”31 
30. Arlie Loughnan, Manifest Madness: Mental Incapacity in Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012) at 3.
31. Zelesne, supra note 7 at 26. See also Bisom-Rapp, supra note 20 at 368.
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raising them only in relation to discrete topics,32 or bringing them into 
play only as part of “policy” discussions that are distinctly separated from 
“doctrinal” analyses.33 Legal scholars who advocate for incorporating 
minority, sexual orientation, feminist, Indigenous, disability, race, and class 
perspectives into doctrinal law teaching demonstrate that such practices 
provide tools for teaching legal skills and for teaching diverse classrooms. 
The pieces of literature that I review share an underlying commitment 
to developing both a learning space and a world where the apparent 
objectivity, neutrality, and centrality of judicial reasoning is challenged. 
The scholars aim to show their students that the assumptions and biases 
that permeate judicial reasoning can be rendered visible, contestable, 
and representative of ways of knowing and being,—which can privilege 
some groups and oppress others. Relatedly, the scholars seek to treat 
the experiences, knowledges, and laws of marginalized, vulnerable, and 
minority individuals and communities as valid and relevant. The literature 
in this section represents of critique-inspired teaching as the authors teach 
judicial reasoning while employing critical political commitments both to 
shape the framing of that reasoning and to show its alternatives. 
Scholars advancing critique-inspired pedagogies identify several 
interrelated educational goals. One overarching goal is that critique-
inspired pedagogies will contribute to students’ skills, including their 
abilities to identify, understand, and value difference. Scholars relate 
such skills to enriching students’ learning outcomes and to enhancing 
students’ capacities to respectfully inquire into and appreciate their clients’ 
experiences, knowledges, backgrounds, and needs in practice. 
Critique-inspired pedagogies aim to equip students to see the effects of 
the legal system’s treatment of some identities—for example, Indigenous, 
woman, queer, disabled, poor—as “deviation[s]”34 from “unstated 
norms.”35 Arlene Kanter writes that, like feminist legal studies and critical 
race theory, “Disability Studies…offers the law and legal education the 
opportunity to critically examine the role of ‘normalcy’ within the law 
and within society, generally. It challenges us to examine our unstated 
assumptions and requires us to recognize, appreciate, and most importantly, 
value differences among us.”36 The practices of learning about and valuing 
differences should help students to see the ways in which law creates, 
32. Zelesne, supra note 7 at 27.
33. Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 41.
34. Kanter, supra note 7 at 406.
35. Ibid, quoting Martha Minow, Making all the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and the American 
Law (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990) at 51.
36. Kanter, supra note 7 at 406.
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legitimizes, and allots differences.37 Disability Studies, Kanter argues, 
will enhance these skills, thus “help[ing] our students to become better 
lawyers, and perhaps more importantly, help[ing] to promote fairness and 
justice in society.”38
Writing from a critical race perspective, Deborah Zalesne similarly 
proposes that teachers should affirm that oppression is a regular, systemic 
occurrence—that it is built into the foundations of state law—rather 
than an isolated, unusual event.39 Like Kanter, Zalesne expressly aims to 
create “better lawyers”—lawyers “who are more capable of practicing 
law holistically.”40 Zelesne conceptualizes a “holistic” law practice as one 
in which students and lawyers “understand the law, how it operates in 
our society, and most importantly, how to use it on behalf of clients and 
society.”41 She also views new law students as already being equipped 
“with values and beliefs about how the law can impact social and political 
issues.”42 Rather than stifling these knowledges and capacities, critique-
inspired teaching aims to “get students to bring what they already know 
about social mores, cultural values, and historical perspectives to bear 
in the class discussion, making cases more ‘real’ and students more 
passionate, more analytic, and more confident.”43 Zalesne further places 
a responsibility to develop holistic lawyers on all law professors: “Law 
professors have a great deal of power because we teach students what to 
include and what to exclude in their analysis of the law. It is incumbent 
upon law professors to make people of color visible in contracting.”44 
Okianer Christian Dark similarly argues that all law professors must 
address issues relating to diversity and oppression: “[s]tudents need to 
hear all professors address diversity issues…Everyone…is responsible for 
changing society so that it is far more inclusive and fair to all members 
of the community.”45 With respect to the purposes of critique-inspired 
pedagogies, Dark argues that discussions relating to “race, gender, class, 
sexual orientation, and disability in law school education” can “aid…
substantially in the intellectual depth and breadth of the law student.”46 
Dark maintains that by engaging in these discussions, students will be 
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid at 405 [emphasis added].
39. Zalesne, supra note 7 at 24.
40. Ibid at 27.
41. Ibid at 46.
42. Ibid at 27.
43. Ibid at 28.
44. Ibid at 46.
45. Dark, supra note 2 at 556.
46. Ibid at 544 [footnotes omitted].
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better equipped to construct legal arguments and to recognize doctrine’s 
assumptions and subjectivities, which will in turn enable them to identify 
its unequal applications.47 Dark is also committed to developing students’ 
abilities to draw on their own diverse experiences—she sees connections 
between legal problem-solving skills and other problem-solving skills. In 
particular, Dark argues that teaching students to make those connections 
will make them not only better lawyers but also better citizens: students 
“should be shown how they might build a bridge between the legal 
problem-resolving system and their own so that they can be effective 
lawyers and citizens.”48 Furthermore, Dark views legal skills as including 
a student’s capacity to care for others. She suggests that “[a]n analysis 
of legal materials with an explicit consideration of diversity issues will 
strengthen and expand a student’s intellectual capacity, as well as her 
capacity for passion and compassion.”49 
Angela Harris and Cynthia Lee similarly argue that teaching 
students how to critique judicial reasoning, how to seek policy change 
through legislation, and how to gain an understanding of the theoretical 
underpinnings of criminal law serve the aim of producing better lawyers.50 
Harris and Lee argue that their commitments “enhance” the law school 
“project of professional training.”51 They edit an American criminal law 
casebook that is premised on the claim “that substantive criminal law is 
an expressive enterprise: Legislatures pass criminal laws in large part 
to reflect their constituents’ moral outrage at certain kinds of behavior. 
Moreover…substantive criminal law is inevitably entwined with culture, 
and American culture is shot through with subordination on the bases of 
race, gender, sexuality, and class.”52 Harris and Lee explain that their goal 
is to produce students who do “not just learn what the law is, but [learn] to 
think critically about whether it should be the way it is, and if not, how it 
ought to be changed.”53
Critique-inspired pedagogies can also involve teaching Indigenous 
law in addition to teaching state law and critical perspectives for 
understanding state law. For example, Khylee Quince argues that teaching 
Indigenous law and legal values can develop students’ abilities to see 
people in context and to avoid framing groups of people through their 
47. Ibid at 544-551.
48. Ibid at 552.
49. Ibid at 544 [footnote omitted, emphasis added]. See also Bisom-Rapp, supra note 20 at 370.
50. Angela P Harris & Cynthia Lee, “Teaching Criminal Law from a Critical Perspective” (2009) 7:1 
Ohio St J of Crim L 261.
51. Ibid at 266.
52. Ibid at 265.
53. Ibid at 265-266.
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representations in state law and state legal processes.54 Quince strives 
to achieve these objectives by incorporating Māori law and legal theory 
into her first-year criminal law teaching: “[a]s I inform our students, we 
are more than a criminogenic profile, which presents us as people with 
issues with violence, addictions, and victimisation. Those behaviours 
are not who we are—those are symptoms of our marginalisation and 
colonisation.”55 Similar to Kanter, Zalesne, and Dark, Quince regards her 
teaching practices as being intimately connected with developing better 
students and lawyers. She writes that her “strategies…are part of a broader 
attempt to mould students into legal thinkers and practitioners who are 
mindful and respectful…In respect of legal education and the practice of 
law, I view the goal of mindfulness as reflecting the human focus of law as 
a discipline centred upon communication and problem-solving.”56 
A second, and related, goal of critique-inspired pedagogies is to 
foster a classroom environment where diversity is respected, legitimized, 
and valued.57 These pedagogies call upon students from privileged 
backgrounds to question their assumptions and to recognize multiple ways 
of understanding and experiencing the world. As Julia Tolmie writes, “[m]
any of our students will be from backgrounds of relative privilege and will 
in their careers be called upon to advocate for, and pass judgment on, those 
who occupy social positions and lives that they will never experience. We 
are failing these students if we allow them to imagine that their own values 
reflect a neutral set of norms that can be non-reflexively applied.”58 
At the same time, critique-inspired teaching aims to ease the burdens 
carried by minority students and to enhance minority students’ educational 
experiences.59 Because white, male, heteronormative, economically 
stable, and physically and mentally able experiences and perspectives 
dominate law, those experiences and perspectives can easily be cast as 
objective, uncontestable norms.60 At the same time, minority experiences 
and perspectives can be framed as biased and subjective.61 
54. Quince, supra note 7.
55. Ibid at 166.
56. Ibid at 171.
57. See e.g. Frances Lee Ansley, “Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal Education” (1991) 79:6 
Cal L Rev 1511 at 1528-1530.
58. Tolmie, supra note 1 at 174.
59. See e.g. Crenshaw, supra note 7; Quince, supra note 7; Calleros, supra note 20; Dueker, supra 
note 20; Bisom-Rapp, supra note 20; Zalesne, supra note 7 at 46-47.
60. See Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 35, 48.
61. Ibid at 35-36.
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Kimberlé Crenshaw aims to shift these practices: she writes about 
the importance of bringing multiple perspectives into the classroom62 and 
about “plac[ing] an entire legal framework at issue.”63 When teachers 
introduce multiple, contrasting perspectives, they can “destabilize” 
the “apparent objectivity” of legal reasoning.64 “[M]ore importantly,” 
teachers “can loosen the constraints upon those who have been forced 
to adopt a perspective which is often at odds with their reality.”65 
Relatedly, asking students to question a legal framework can contribute 
to students’ development of legal skills by “illuminat[ing] better the racial 
consequences of dominant values, concepts, and rules.”66 Additionally, and 
“[m]ore importantly,” the practice values the knowledges and experiences 
of minority students.67 In particular, Crenshaw argues that teaching about, 
and questioning the law’s structural generation of power imbalances 
“revalues distinct minority experiences; no longer are they cultural 
handicaps that either must be overcome or made the subject of occasional 
observation. Such experiences are instead, sources of knowledge that can 
be legitimately and powerfully utilized in legal analysis.”68 As Crenshaw 
continues, “[m]inority students can gain the advantage that their majority 
colleagues share: their vision of the world, their experiences and values 
and the things that they take for granted can be legitimately included.”69 
In the next section, I carry out a textual analysis of English-language 
Canadian criminal law casebooks to examine the relationship between 
doctrine and critique within the books. Strikingly, several Canadian 
criminal law casebooks utilize critique-inspired approaches that pursue the 
objective of producing better, or more effective, lawyers. The abundance 
of critique-inspired approaches within 21st century Canadian criminal law 
casebooks stands in marked contrast to Canadian contract law casebooks, 
where only one casebook has pursued an approach of teaching contract 
law in its policy context.70 In what follows, I turn first to the English-
language Canadian criminal law casebooks that have adopted “doctrine 
62. Ibid at 48.
63. Ibid at 43.
64. Ibid at 48.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid at 43.
67. Ibid at 44.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid [emphasis in original]. 
70. Angela Swan, Nicholas C Bala & Jakub Adamski, eds, Contracts: Cases, Notes & Materials, 
9th ed (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2015). See David Sandomierski, “Canadian Contract Law 
Casebooks,” supra note 12 at 1191-1199.
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first, critique second” approaches, and then consider the casebooks that 
move towards and embrace critique-inspired pedagogies. 
II. Doctrine-first teaching in English-language Canadian criminal law 
casebooks
1. “This casebook deals primarily with general principles of criminal 
law and with defences”: Schmeiser 
The first English-language Canadian criminal law casebook, Cases and 
Comments on Criminal Law, was published in 1966 and edited by Douglas 
Schmeiser. Schmeiser intended for the book to fill what he described as 
nearly a vacuum in Canadian criminal law material.71 While the book was 
“compiled as a teaching aid,” Schmeiser added that “practitioners may 
find it a convenient reference to leading cases.”72 
Schmeiser contains case excerpts along with references to, and a few 
excerpts from, legislative provisions, comments (including questions), 
and a few excerpts from secondary sources.73 The questions are generally 
geared towards testing and sharpening readers’ understanding what the 
law is, revealing a commitment to teaching judicial reasoning without 
teaching critique. For example, following an excerpt from the Canadian 
Encyclopedic Digest concerning “Lack of Criminal Intent,” Schmeiser 
asks: “[i]s the formulation of the doctrine of mens rea by the Canadian 
Encyclopedic Digest correct?”74 Moreover, Schmeiser guides students in 
gaining an understanding of the law by reading cases. For instance, in one 
comment, Schmeiser asks readers to consider the following questions: “Is 
R. v. Ping Yuen rightly decided? Is it reconcilable with R. v. Regina Cold 
Storage, infra? Is it consistent with Beaver v. R., infra? Would the case 
be decided the same way today?”75 Given that the tools for analysis are 
cases, judicial reasoning is meant to guide students in these evaluations. 
The materials and questions are in keeping with Schmeiser’s introductory 
statement that “[t]his casebook deals primarily with general principles 
of criminal law and with defences.”76 Schmeiser is thus illustrative of 
Langdell’s casebook method—a method which implies a belief that law 
can (and should) be learned by reading multiple cases on particular points 
of law. 
71. Schmeiser, supra note 22 at vii.
72. Ibid at vii.
73. See e.g. CED (West, 2nd ed) vol 7 at 328, reproduced in Schmeiser, supra note 23 at 176; 
Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on the Law of Insanity (Canada: Queen’s Printer, 1956), 
reproduced in Schmeiser, supra note 23 at 476 [McRuer Report].
74. Schmeiser, supra note 22 at 176.
75. Ibid at 228.
76. Ibid at vii.
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A close look at the “Insanity” section reveals, nonetheless, that 
Schmeiser saw some limited room for critique. The section reproduces 
section 16 of the Criminal Code,77 which provides the statutory framework 
for the defence and sets out a list of 13 problems.78 Only two questions 
call upon students to exercise their own evaluative judgment: “[a]re 
you satisfied with our insanity rules? Can you propose any worthwhile 
amendments?”79 These questions represent a small step in the direction of 
envisioning students as future law reformers and legislators rather than as 
practicing criminal lawyers. Such a vision of criminal law students was 
prominent in the American legal academy by this time.80 The approach 
also manifests strongly in Friedland, which was a Canadian criminal law 
casebook that was published shortly after Schmeiser.81
The comments surrounding case law from other jurisdictions similarly 
include reform-oriented questions. For example, one of the cases is from 
the United States and sets out a different approach to the defence than 
that followed in Canada.82 Schmeiser asks, “[d]o you think the Durham 
test is superior to s. 16 of the Criminal Code? Do you think that the result 
would be much different in practice?”83 These types of questions not only 
ask readers to compare different judicial analyses in different jurisdictions 
but also to consider whether changes would make a difference in practice. 
Again, these questions suggest that Schmeiser saw some room for critique 
in criminal law learning—if only a small and secondary role.
In a review of Schmeiser, Mary Virginia MacLean explains that 
the book emerged at a time when the merits of doctrine-centred law 
teaching were being debated.84 MacLean observes that “[t]he teaching of 
law has been, and still is, an area of turmoil.”85 Criticisms of the case 
method included views that students would become “cloud[ed]” by the 
plethora of judgments, and thus would not learn to “understand…the basic 
principles.”86 While a casebook might eliminate this “cloudiness” through 
77. Ibid at 458, citing Criminal Code, SC 1953-54, c 51, s 16. For the most recent statutory 
framework, see Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 16.
78. Ibid at 458-59. 
79. Ibid at 459.
80. See Anders Walker, “The Anti-Case Method: Herbert Wechsler and the Political History of the 
Criminal Law Course” (2009) 7:1 Ohio St J of Crim L 217 at 218, 239-240.
81. Further discussion will be found at 24-26, below.
82. Durham v US, 214 Fed (2d) 862 (App Ct DC Cir 1954), reproduced in Schmeiser, supra note 22 
at 480.
83. Schmeiser, supra note 22 at 483.
84. Mary Virginia MacLean, Book Review of Cases and Comments on Criminal Law by DA 
Schmeiser, (1967) 5:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 327 at 327.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
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its use of short excerpts from judgments, it can also be regarded as “too 
one-sided; that is, the extracts represent the personal choice of the author.”87 
Another criticism of the case method is that the practice inhibits students 
from learning how to “think”—from understanding “why” judgments say 
what they say.88 The “Insanity” chapter demonstrates that Schmeiser was 
likely alive to these debates. He likely chose to favour the case method but 
was aware of a need to ensure that students grasped “the basic issues”89 
and also to devote some time to developing students’ abilities to think 
about law reform. 
Schmeiser was last published in 1985.90 Despite the debates 
surrounding the case method, another Canadian criminal law casebook—
Stuart—has continued to favour a doctrinal introduction to criminal law. 
I turn to Stuart next, showing that the casebook illustrates the extension 
of doctrine-first teaching in Canadian criminal law and includes a more 
explicit claim of the importance of teaching critique after students have 
learned to read cases and legislation.
2. “Our students need to be informed before they can be truly 
critical”:91 Stuart
A doctrinal introduction to criminal law was evident in the first edition of 
Stuart, published in 1982.92 By this time, there was “a growing literature 
on Canadian substantive law.”93 In the preface to the first edition, Don 
Stuart and Ronald Delisle explain that their aim is to “develop a sound, 
basic approach to the subject.”94 They viewed their book as constituting a 
source of teaching materials rather than a resource for practitioners.95 This 
approach is reminiscent of Langdell’s casebook approach, which involved 
“preparing and publishing…a selection of cases as would be adapted to 
my purpose as a teacher.”96
Additionally, Stuart and Delisle aimed to adopt a neutral approach: 
“[w]e kept our questions and notes to a minimum as we believe criminal 
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Schmeiser, supra note 22 at vii.
90. Douglas A Schmeiser, Canadian Criminal Law: Cases and Comments (Toronto: Butterworths, 
1985).
91. Stuart, supra note 17 at v.
92. Don Stuart & Ronald Joseph Delisle, Learning Canadian Criminal Law (Toronto: Carswell, 
1982).
93. Ibid at iii.
94. Ibid.
95. “The book is not intended to do double duty and act as a portable library of leading cases for the 
practitioner.” (Ibid).
96. Langdell, supra note 4 at vi [emphasis added].
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law teachers who use these materials will wish to be free of our prejudices 
in a very controversial subject.”97 Of course, though, as MacLean notes in 
her review of Schmeiser, an editor’s choice of materials can still reflect an 
editor’s prejudices: choosing to include cases as the primary material for 
teaching law, choosing to include particular cases and topics, and choosing 
to limit the written comments around cases are necessarily editorial choices 
that embed particular presuppositions about the nature of law. In this case, 
the editorial choices convey views that appellate reasoning is (or can be) 
logical and that criminal law’s controversies can be identified and studied 
primarily through a review of cases. 
In the 2018 edition of Stuart, Stuart and Coughlan maintain the 
commitment to teaching criminal law through substantive criminal law 
doctrine. In the introduction, Stuart and Coughlan defend their choice 
to focus on doctrine rather than on critique. Their introduction prepares 
students for an immersion into criminal law’s doctrinal worldview from 
the start, indicating that doctrinal analysis is the cornerstone for becoming 
“informed”:
Although the development of a critical perspective is key to any university 
environment, we believe it essential to ensure that we provide a full and 
complete analysis of the existing laws before we turn to critical analysis. 
Our students need to be informed before they can be truly critical…Our 
approach throughout has been to concentrate on the major sources: the 
Criminal Code itself, key judicial decisions and critical review.98
These same passages can first be found in the fourth edition of Stuart, 
edited by Stuart and Delisle and published in 1993.99 In the introduction 
to the fourth edition, Stuart and Coughlan specify that the structure of 
the “Fault” chapter exemplifies their approach of teaching doctrine and 
then critique: “[o]ur students need to be informed before they can be truly 
critical. For example, in teaching fault we study the subjective awareness 
of risk approach, the extent to which the law presently recognizes absolute 
liability and objective standards, types of negligence and Charter standards, 
and only then do we consider normative and other critical approaches.”100 
The chapter on fault in the 2018 edition maintains the overall format 
of doctrine and then critique. Moreover, the secondary source excerpts 
in the “Normative Theories” section have remained the same. One of 
97. Stuart, supra note 92 at iii.
98. Stuart, supra note 17 at v. See also Sandomierski, Aspiration and Reality, supra note 2 at 240-
244.
99. Don Stuart & Ronald Joseph Delisle, Learning Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed (Scarborough: 
Carswell, 1993) at v.
100. Ibid [emphasis added].
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the excerpts comes from Rosemary Cairns Way’s LLM thesis.101 Cairns 
Way encourages “a multidimensional, contextualized approach to fault…
Decisions about responsibility should invoke a rich and multifaceted debate 
about the nature and appropriate allocation of blame, the assumption of 
free will and the efficacy of the criminal law as a mechanism of social 
control.”102 This comment considers Canadian criminal law’s purposes 
and claims about people and relationships. The “Normative Theories” 
section thus demonstrates that Stuart includes non-judicial frameworks for 
understanding and evaluating case law. Yet the inclusion of these critical 
accounts at the very end of the fault chapter suggests these perspectives 
are an afterthought rather than the main material to be learned. Such a 
message would be consistent with Stuart’s objectives.
In the introduction to the 2018 edition, Stuart and Coughlan also 
tell readers that “the major focus for studying criminal law in first-year 
law school should be on the tools that lawyers and judges must know 
and use in the daily business of the conduct of a criminal trial.”103 Stuart 
and Coughlan acknowledge “that law students, teachers and lawyers can 
better understand law if they seek help from the many disciplines that now 
offer insights into the criminal justice system.”104 However, they decide 
to devote their “time and energy” to teaching readers about “substantive 
principles and the trial context: the adversary system, how the elements of 
crime are proved, defences, and sentencing issues.”105 
Stuart’s approach takes a particular lawyer-centred perspective as 
its starting-point—one that sees judicial reasoning as nearly definitive 
of criminal law practice. This approach runs the risk of omitting other 
significant aspects of criminal law practice and study. For example, in 
notable contrast, Quince offers a frank acknowledgment of the practical, 
personal, and emotional difficulties that are faced by criminal law 
practitioners and of the importance of teaching students about these 
realities:
Alongside the necessary emphasis on doctrinal education should be 
some commitment to acknowledging how difficult it can be to work in 
the criminal justice field. Criminal practitioners are exposed to evidence, 
information, and accounts of extreme human behaviour. We establish 
101. Rosemary Cairns Way, The Charter, the Supreme Court and the Invisible Politics of Fault (LLM 
Thesis, Queen’s University Faculty of Law, 1992) [unpublished], reproduced in Stuart, supra note 17 
at 581.
102. Ibid at 582-583.
103. Stuart, supra note 17 at v. 
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
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rapport and relationships with wrongdoers and their victims…Criminal 
law educators have a responsibility to discuss this openly.106
When the focal point is judicial analysis rather than the impacts that 
judicial analysis has and the oppression it generates, teaching materials 
have the potential to miss out on (or to acknowledge but cast to the 
sidelines) diverse perspectives, values, and experiences that might matter 
to people represented in cases, to people with whom students might engage, 
and to students and teachers themselves. In terms of professional practice, 
Eduardo Capulong argues that teaching methods that leave out clients’ 
needs can lead to modes of practice that ultimately do not serve clients: 
As lawyers, we can be as skilled, devoted, and intrepid as we want. But 
without understanding, knowing how to work with, and finding common 
cause with our clients—as individuals, organizations, coalitions, 
communities, and social movements—and without attending to the 
political, social, economic, and historical circumstances in which we, 
together, find ourselves, we do our clients a disservice and accomplish 
nothing long-term.107 
We can see an illustrative example of the limited view of people 
that Stuart’s doctrine-first approach generates in the section on “Insanity 
(Mental Disorder).” Stuart’s contents in this section epitomize the practice 
of viewing people through the lens of appellate courts’ representations of 
people, reflecting that “human identity and circumstance are defined by 
legal doctrine and formal institutions.”108  
In Canadian criminal law doctrine, the image of the rational and 
independent individual is especially present in case law relating to the 
defence of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.109 
This legal subject can be seen in Stuart’s introduction and excerpt from 
Cooper v R.,110 decided by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1979. In 
their introduction to Cooper, Stuart and Coughlan comment that “[t]he 
accused was charged with the murder of a patient at a psychiatric hospital 
(the detailed facts and the accused’s psychiatric history are considered 
106. Quince, supra note 7 at 171.
107. Eduardo RC Capulong, “Client as Subject: Humanizing the Legal Curriculum” (2016) 23:1 
Clinical L Rev 37 at 37.
108. Ibid at 39, citing Ann Shalleck, “Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education” (1993) 
45:6 Stan L Rev 1731 at 1737.
109. See e.g. Benjamin L Berger, “Mental Disorder and the Instability of Blame in Criminal Law” 
in François Tanguay-Renaud & James Stribopoulos, eds, Rethinking Criminal Law Theory: New 
Canadian Perspectives in the Philosophy of Domestic, Transnational, and International Criminal 
Law (Oxford: Hart, 2012) 117.
110. Cooper v R (1979), [1980] 1 SCR 1149, 13 CR (3d) 97, reproduced in Stuart, supra note 17 at 
789 [Cooper].
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below)…[T]he Court discussed the meaning of the term ‘disease of the 
mind’ and explained what is entailed by ‘appreciating’ the nature and 
quality of an act or omission.”111 Immediately, the editors introduce 
Gary Cooper without referring to his first-hand personal experiences and 
identities. They instead refer to his identity only as an accused person in 
a murder trial. Because this case involves the defence of mental disorder, 
it specifically brings into question whether Gary Cooper fits within the 
law’s presumed depiction of someone who can be held responsible—a 
depiction that involves human capacities for understanding one’s actions 
and the consequences resulting from them. In particular, Justice Dickson 
quoted with approval the following passage from the McRuer Report: 
“The true test necessarily is, was the accused person at the very time of the 
offence—not before or after, but at the moment of the offence—by reason 
of disease of the mind, unable…to appreciate not only the nature of the act 
but the natural consequences that would flow from it?”112 The person with 
whom criminal law claims to be concerned is thus an individual who has, 
among other features, the “ability to perceive the consequences, impact 
and results of a physical act.”113 
In addition to case excerpts and comments, Stuart’s section on 
mental disorder contains a few critical commentaries on psychiatry. For 
instance, Stuart and Coughlan write that, “[w]ith any psychiatric label, 
and [‘psychopathic syndrome’] in particular, lawyers should request that 
psychiatrists be as precise as possible in their descriptions of the actual 
behaviour of the individual before the court rather than hide behind their 
imperfect abstractions. Clearly they are too imprecise for use as legal criteria 
of responsibility.”114 Similarly, they note, “[m]odern critics complain that 
the [Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders] categories are 
still not the subject of scientifically verified research, that they have grown 
exponentially, that psychiatrists too often tend to blindly rely on them 
to prescribe psychoactive drugs, and that psychiatrists have become too 
beholden to the pharmaceutical industry.”115 This latter comment follows 
an excerpt from TS Szasz’s “Psychiatry, Ethics and the Criminal Law.”116 
111. Stuart, supra note 17 at 789.
112. Cooper in Stuart, supra note 110 at 793, quoting McRuer Report, supra note 73 at 13.
113. Cooper in Stuart, supra note 110 at 793.
114. Stuart, supra note 17 at 781.
115. Ibid at 782, citing Marcia Angell, “The Illusions of Psychiatry”, The New York Review of Books 
(14 July 2011). The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is currently in its fifth 
edition: American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
5th ed (Arlington: American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
116. TS Szasz, “Psychiatry, Ethics and the Criminal Law” (1958) 58:2 Colum L Rev 183, reproduced 
in Stuart, supra note 17 at 781. 
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In this excerpt, Szasz criticizes the idea that psychiatrists and jurors can 
make factual findings of mental illness, arguing instead that these findings 
are actually theories of illness: “if the notion of ‘mental illness’ means 
anything, it means that it is the theory by means of which we ‘explain’ how 
the events in question might have occurred.”117 
These critiques helpfully highlight the law’s practice of making 
determinations with respect to the mental disorder defence by considering, 
but not solely relying upon, psychiatrists’ diagnoses. Unfortunately, the 
discussion stops short of questioning readers about their own perceptions 
of connections between mental disabilities and criminal responsibility. 
Similarly, the discussion excludes comments about the discrimination 
faced by people living with mental disabilities, both within and outside 
the legal system.
Given that Stuart and Coughlan explicitly decide, in their preface, to 
take a doctrine-first approach to teaching criminal law, teaching criminal 
law in the way they do is fitting. In identifying some critiques of this 
approach, I do not mean to isolate Stuart. Indeed, most contract law 
casebooks take a similar approach.118 And, as other Canadian criminal law 
casebook editors also seem to indicate, I also think that learning how to 
read judicial reasoning, and how to communicate within it, is an important 
skill.119 I have identified some critiques as part of my effort to illustrate 
that when evaluated from a critique-inspired perspective a “doctrine first, 
critique second” approach leaves out, or casts to the sidelines, much of 
people’s varied experiences and values (including those of students 
themselves and of people whom students read about in cases) and of 
criminal law’s actual impacts. 
III. Critique-inspired teaching in English-language Canadian Criminal 
Law casebooks
1. Towards a critique-inspired approach: Criminal Law’s contexts in 
Friedland/Roach
Martin Friedland first published Cases and Materials on Criminal Law 
and Procedure in 1967—one year after Schmeiser first published Cases 
and Comments on Criminal Law.120 As MacLean notes in her review of 
117. Ibid at 782.
118. See generally Sandomierski, “Canadian Contract Law Casebooks,” supra note 11; Sandomierski, 
Aspiration and Reality, supra note 2. 
119. See also Dark, supra note 2.
120. The first edition of Friedland was a temporary version. See Friedland, supra note 24 at v. See also 
RS Mackay, Book Review of Cases and Materials on Criminal Law and Procedure, by ML Friedland, 
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Schmeiser, this was a time when debates about the case method were 
taking place.121 A 1965 study similarly documents that the casebook 
method was still in use in the United States.122 However, adaptations of 
the method had emerged.123 With respect to criminal law, Anders Walker 
argues that a shift in teaching method took place in the United States 
beginning in the 1930s.124 Walker argues this shift was apparent in Jerome 
Michael and Herbert Wechsler’s preparation of a new kind of criminal 
law casebook, Criminal Law and its Administration: Cases, Statutes, and 
Commentaries125 in the 1930s.126 While traces of this shift are evident in 
Schmeiser, the shift appears to have had a stronger influence on Friedland.
According to Walker’s research, Wechsler and Michael aimed to “open 
students’ eyes to law’s interrelationship with society,”127 incorporating a 
smaller number of cases than a leading 1894 criminal law casebook128 and 
an assortment of materials coming from sources such as law review articles, 
scholarly books, commission reports, and legislation from jurisdictions 
outside the United States.129 Notes in the casebook ask probing questions, 
encouraging students to consider, for example, whether they agree with 
the argument presented by a scholar.130 Walker further maintains that 
Wechsler and Michael’s approach has continued to influence criminal 
law teaching throughout the United States. Drawing on Laura Kalman’s 
research, which identified the book as “the first law school casebook to 
successfully synthesize social science materials with cases,”131 Walker 
argues that the book proceeded to “inspir[e] a generation of criminal law 
teachers to organize their courses along similar lines.”132 
The move away from including only (or primarily) appellate case 
law in criminal law casebooks took place in the United States and 
2d ed, (1969) 19:3 UTLJ 445 at 445-446.
121. See generally MacLean, supra note 84.
122. Arthur D Austin, “Is the Casebook Method Obsolete?” (1965) 6:2 Wm & Mary L Rev 157.
123. Ibid.
124. Walker, supra note 80.
125. Jerome Michael & Herbert Wechsler, Criminal Law and Its Administration: Cases, Statutes, and 
Commentaries (Chicago: Foundation Press, 1940).
126. Walker, supra note 80 at 228, 218, n 5. The first edition was officially published in 1940.
127. Walker, supra note 80 at 219, citing interview by Norman Silber and Geoffrey Miller with 
Herbert Wechsler, Professor, Columbia University School of Law, in New York City, NY (11 August 
1978; 23 February 1979; 12 & 13 March 1982).
128. Walker, supra note 80 at 220, citing Joseph Henry Beale, Jr, A Selection of Cases and Other 
Authorities upon Criminal Law (Cambridge: Harvard Law Review Publication Association, 1894).
129. Walker, supra note 80 at 229.
130. Ibid at 230.
131. Ibid at 218, citing Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927–1960 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1986) at 90, 97.
132. Walker, supra note 80 at 218.
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Australia.133 In both places criminal law was a subject area that came to 
serve as a site for teaching the criminal process, criminal law’s moral and 
philosophical questions, and legislative reform, in addition to appellate 
case law. The approach has been aligned with legal realism, which, as 
a school of thought, had influences on both critical legal studies and the 
law and society movement.134 Moreover, Wechsler and Michael’s “anti-
case method”135 has been connected with reimagining the role of the law 
student. The shift in the United States involved a vision of the law student 
as a future legislator and law reformer, rather than as a criminal defence 
lawyer or prosecutor.136 The introduction of a criminal law textbook in 
Australia in 1962 imagined the law student as a morally aware, “serious, 
reform-orientated, critical” future lawyer.137 
Similar to these developments, Friedland contains traces of Wechsler 
and Michael’s “anti-case method.”138 Notably, Friedland bears particular 
resemblance to one American criminal law casebook that followed in 
Wechsler and Friedland’s footsteps—Monrad Paulsen and Sanford 
Kadish’s Criminal Law and Its Processes: Cases and Materials, first 
published in 1962 (Kadish).139 Kadish and Friedland are similar in that 
they both bring together criminal procedure and substantive criminal law. 
Additionally, they both include a discussion of the relationship between 
criminal law and morality early on, including excerpts from the Report 
of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution140 and from 
Devlin’s “The Enforcement of Morals.”141 
Friedland aimed to integrate the various components of the criminal 
law process and to incorporate discussion and reflection on criminal 
law’s scope and aims.142 An emphasis on teaching criminal law in its 
133. On the United States, see generally Walker, supra note 80. On Australia, see Susan Bartie, Free 
Hands and Minds: Pioneering Australian Legal Scholars (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2019) at ch 4.
134. Harris & Lee, supra note 50 at 264-66.
135. See generally Walker, supra note 80.
136. Ibid at 217-18. But see Harris & Lee, supra note 50 (arguing that policy and practice could be 
viewed as more connected than Walker presents them) at 263-264.
137. Bartie, supra note 133 at 65, 71. 
138. Walker, supra note 80.
139. Monrad G Paulsen & Sanford H Kadish, Criminal Law and Its Processes: Cases and Materials 
(Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1962) [Kadish]. On Kadish, see Walker, supra note 80 at 218-219, 238-
244.
140. UK, The Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (1957), reprinted in 
Kadish, supra note 139 at 5, and in Friedland, supra note 23 at 64.
141. Patrick Devlin, “The Enforcement of Morals” (Maccabaean Lecture in Jurisprudence of the 
British Academy, 1959), reprinted in Kadish, supra note 139 at 8, and in Friedland, supra note 23 at 
66.
142. “Such areas as the relationship between law and morality, criminal procedure, and sentencing—
formerly reserved for an optional course in the third year—are examined here.” (Friedland, supra note 
23 at v.)
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context appears in the second chapter, which deals with pre-arraignment 
procedures. The chapter begins with a description of the process in 
Toronto: “[a]n arrested accused is taken to one of the many police division 
stations in Toronto, ‘booked,’ lodged in a cell, and, for indictable offences, 
fingerprinted and photographed. He is liable to be questioned at any time 
while in police custody.”143 The explanation focuses on practical aspects 
of the criminal process that would be important to people who are arrested 
and charged. 
Friedland’s chapter on “Insanity” begins with the “stages of criminal 
process in which insanity may be relevant.”144 Similar to the chapter on 
pre-arraignment procedures, the procedural content highlights some 
of the practical experiences faced by accused persons and offenders. 
Additionally, by drawing readers’ attention to procedural practices and 
legal rules that exist in other jurisdictions, Friedland, like Schmeiser, 
demonstrates that law and law’s procedures constitute choices about how 
to depict, treat, and respond to people. For instance, the sentencing section 
in the insanity chapter includes a discussion of law reform that took place 
in England around the Mental Health Act, 1959,145 which enabled courts to 
make hospital orders, leading to offenders “being compulsorily admitted 
to hospital.”146 In introducing this excerpt, Friedland commented that this 
English procedure “has no counterpart in Canada.”147 
Friedland’s contextual approach to criminal law teaching has carried 
on with the continued publication of Cases and Materials in Criminal 
Law and Procedure. The 2020 edition (Roach) shows that judicial 
analysis exists within broader social, political, institutional, procedural, 
and historical contexts. In the preface the editors write that this edition 
“include[s] fuller extracts of leading cases” along with “more secondary 
and contextual readings, giving students access to scholarly and policy 
literature on the criminal law while enriching the text’s attention to issues 
of Indigenous justice, racial and ethnic bias, gender in the criminal law, and 
other matters of deep social importance to the criminal justice system.”148 
The editors also note that “[t]he years have…confirmed the wisdom of 
143. Ibid at 14.
144. Ibid at 278.
145. Mental Health Act, 1959 (UK), 7 & 8 Eliz II, c 72.
146. RM Jackson, Enforcing the Law (London: Macmillan & Co, 1967), reprinted in Friedland, supra 
note 23 at 285-286.
147. Ibid at 285.
148. Roach, supra note 18 at ix.
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Professor Friedland’s original decision to teach criminal law in its broader 
procedural, theoretical, social, and institutional context.”149
Roach’s contextualized approach to criminal law teaching is 
demonstrated in the book’s case study of the wrongful conviction of Donald 
Marshall Jr. This case study depicts people who have different forms of 
involvement with criminal law—for example, defendants, witnesses, 
police officers, judges, lawyers—as interrelated with one another and as 
embedded within the procedural, institutional, professional-ethical, and 
social practices surrounding, and constituting part of, criminal law.150 
Donald Marshall Jr.’s “case is examined both as a case study of a 
wrongful conviction of an innocent person; the importance and difficulty 
of fact-finding in the criminal process; and issues of racism, including the 
treatment of Indigenous people in the justice system.”151 The case study 
includes the report of the Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr. 
Prosecution.152 The excerpts from the Royal Commission’s report focus on 
the practices and actions of the various professional people involved in the 
process, identifying their racially biased actions and situating the existence 
of racialized bias within social and institutional settings. With respect to 
police officers, for example, the Commission found that “Sergeant of 
Detectives John MacIntyre […] discounted Marshall’s version of events 
partly because he considered Marshall a troublemaker and partly because, 
in our view, he shared what we believe was a general sense in Sydney 
White’s community at the time that Indians were not ‘worth’ as much as 
Whites.”153 
In a section of the report devoted to “Visible Minorities and the 
Criminal Justice System,” the Commission reiterated its finding “that 
racism played a part in Donald Marshall Jr.’s wrongful conviction.”154 
The Commission “recognize[d] that many of the causes of discrimination 
are rooted in institutions and social structures outside the criminal justice 
system” and identified “steps” that could, and should, be adopted “to reduce 
discrimination in the justice system itself.”155 This acknowledgement of 
the pervasiveness of racism demonstrates that the criminal justice system 
and the people living within it are affected by, and part of, wider patterns 
149. Ibid.
150. The practice of using a case study can also be found in the second edition of Friedland. See 
Friedland, supra note 23 at ch 17.
151. Roach, supra note 18 at 232.
152. Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr Prosecution (Halifax: Nova Scotia, 1989), 
reprinted in Roach, supra note 18 at 244.
153. Ibid at 245-246.
154. Ibid at 252.
155. Ibid.
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of inequality and discrimination. The book’s inclusion of this analysis 
represents a teaching practice that Crenshaw calls upon law teachers to 
adopt. In particular, she argues that “the frame should be shifted so as to 
illuminate the connection between racial subordination and the values and 
interests that appear to be race-neutral or that are simply being taken for 
granted.”156  
The case study also includes an excerpt from Mary Ellen Turpel’s 
“On the Question of Adapting the Canadian Criminal Justice System for 
Aboriginal Peoples: Don’t Fence Me In.”157 Turpel draws out conceptions 
of people and relationships in Canadian criminal law’s worldview that 
do not resonate with those in Indigenous justice systems. For instance, 
“professionally trained classes of persons…are deeply distrusted in 
Aboriginal cultures because of the experiences with various experts—
experts on education, experts on child welfare, etc.”158 The idea of 
involving “stranger[s],” including unknown lawyers, judges, and jurors, in 
dealing with a particular event, “is alien and terrifying.”159 Taken together, 
the materials in the case study demonstrate that Canadian criminal law’s 
representations of people are not created in a vacuum—they come from 
and contribute to a wider context, and they miss out on perspectives, 
experiences, and laws that also exist within that wider context.
Roach addresses the defence of not criminally responsible on account 
of mental disorder in chapter 15, which deals with “Mental Disorder and 
Automatism.” Consistent with Roach’s goals of covering criminal law 
doctrines in context, the chapter begins with an excerpt from Benjamin 
Berger’s piece, “Mental Disorder and the Instability of Blame in Criminal 
Law.”160 In this excerpt, Berger discusses the theory of the individual 
that underpins the defence of not criminally responsible on account of 
mental disorder, that is, the idea that people are depicted in terms of 
their abilities in exercising “the capacity for practical reasoning and 
cognition.”161 Berger further tells readers that, as applied in current legal 
practice, the defence is inconsistent with its own claims about the types 
of conditions that implicate criminal responsibility. Berger argues that 
conditions that call into question people’s cognitive and reasoning abilities 
156. Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 43.
157. Mary Ellen Turpel, “On the Question of Adapting the Canadian Criminal Justice System for 
Aboriginal Peoples: Don’t Fence Me In” in Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Aboriginal 
Peoples and the Justice System: Report of the National Round Table on Aboriginal Justice Issues 
(Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1993), reprinted in Roach, supra note 18 at 263.
158. Ibid at 265.
159. Ibid.
160. Berger, supra note 109, reprinted in Roach, supra note 18 at 782. 
161. Ibid.
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are regularly excluded from the scope of the defence.162 As Berger writes, 
“[t]he picture painted is of a criminal law chronically detached from or 
comfortably ignorant of situations that raise serious concerns within the 
best accounts of the conditions for criminal responsibility.”163 Following 
the excerpt, the editors summarize Berger’s closing argument as follows: 
“Berger ultimately suggests that ‘the under-inclusive doctrine of mental 
disorder serves as a mechanism for the elision of collective blame for a 
complex social problem’…, allowing us to disregard the difficult issues 
of collective, social, and political responsibility that arise at the meeting 
of mental health, social disadvantage, and crime.”164 The editors then call 
upon readers to “[c]onsider these claims as you study the cases in this 
chapter.”165 
The excerpt from Berger’s writing and the editors’ surrounding 
comments introduce readers to the claims about the human condition that 
both characterize the defence of mental disorder and that are not embraced 
in its application. Roach helpfully places this excerpt at the start of the 
chapter, before the case law. Through this organization, Roach has the 
potential to assist readers in seeing that judicial depictions of people 
are just that—depictions created by judges. These portrayals might 
demonstrate inconsistencies in practice and might not align with what we 
otherwise know about people (in this case, knowledge of the number of 
people in Canadian prisons and correctional centres who live with mental 
health conditions that appear to fit within, but are nonetheless excluded 
from, the boundaries of the defence). The editors’ comment about Berger’s 
final argument reminds readers that criminal law engages not only in a 
practice of depicting the individual appearing before the court, but also 
in a practice of depicting the surrounding communities. The defence of 
mental disorder is one example of criminal law’s tendency to concentrate 
on attributing blame to an individual to the exclusion of identifying ways 
in which broader communities could also be held to account.
Roach’s contextualized portrayals of judicial reasoning and of people 
involved in criminal law’s processes move strongly in the direction of 
showing criminal law’s shortcomings in achieving social justice. Examples 
such as the case study of Donald Marshall Jr.’s wrongful conviction and 
the early discussion of the narrowness of the mental disorder defence 
demonstrate that Roach shows the limits of judicial analysis in dismantling 
162. Ibid at 782-783.
163. Ibid at 783.
164. Roach, supra note 18 at 783, citing Berger, supra note 109 at 136.
165. Roach, supra note 18 at 783.
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power relations. This type of commitment is similarly pursued in another 
casebook that was most recently published in 2016—Saunders. 
2. “Critically examining the traditional approach to criminal law”: 
Saunders
Similar to Roach, Saunders aims to “contextualize…the study of criminal 
law in a Canadian setting.”166 Saunders was first published in 1989167 and 
most recently published in 2016. Like Roach, Saunders “explores the 
historical, theoretical, sociological and political contexts of the criminal 
law and its administration.”168 Yet Saunders is more critique-oriented 
than Roach. In particular, Saunders “critically examin[es] the traditional 
approach to criminal law found in the Criminal Code and the common 
law.”169 The editors claim to teach doctrine through critical examination 
of it. 
Saunders’ critical view of doctrine is exemplified in the chapter, 
“Perspectives on Criminal Law.” The introduction to this chapter is written 
by Saunders, and he articulates his vision of criminal law as follows:
Criminal law…is a reflection of the views and perspectives of policy 
makers on what they want the law, and specifically criminal law, to 
accomplish. It is also a reflection of their views on human nature and 
human activity, as well as a statement about the potential of the state 
to interfere in social conflicts and to control human behaviour in a 
meaningful and effective manner.170
Saunders views criminal law as a human-made and human-operated 
enterprise. He specifically critiques formalistic approaches to law in the 
section on “Traditional Legal Perspectives,” writing that “[t]he essential 
criticism of traditional legal approaches is that they are overarchingly 
oriented toward the formal manifestations of law and the institutions and 
processes that surround those manifestations.”171
Saunders also shows that traditional, formalistic approaches are 
embedded in Canada’s legal educational practices: “Law school study 
is still focused on the courts, the cases, and the formal rules, in spite of 
the calls in the last two decades for more interdisciplinary and socialized 
approaches to the study of law.”172 Saunders demonstrates that law 
166. Saunders, supra note 18, back cover.
167. Ron P Saunders & Chet N Mitchell, An Introduction to Criminal Law in Context (North York: 
Captus Press, 1989).
168. Saunders, supra note 18, back cover. 
169. Ibid.
170. Ibid at 51.
171. Ibid at 55.
172. Ibid, citing Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, Law and Learning: Report 
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schools continue to teach with a Langdellian approach: “It is a technical, 
professional training which teaches students how to argue, manipulate, 
and use the rules, and not necessarily to understand the reality and impact 
of the rules in their social setting.”173 Saunders urges readers to instead 
learn about the actual manifestations of law within social life:
We have to understand that the dilemmas and contradictions in the law 
and its stated ideals are very real; that equality is often there in rhetoric 
but not in practice; that who you are, the colour of your skin, your income, 
your class background and other social, gender and ethnic factors can all 
combine to play an important part in the nature and outcome of one’s 
interaction with the criminal justice system.174 
Saunders regards the impacts of law on people’s lives as being more 
important than what formal legal rules claim to be doing. Saunders thus 
pursues the critique-inspired objective of creating better lawyers—here, 
lawyers who inquire into policy and lived experiences. Additionally, by 
offering insight into his own perspectives, he makes it convenient for 
readers to hop on board with his views, to feel validated by them, or to 
disagree and identify particular points of divergence. 
In the “Defence of Mental Disorder” section, Mitchell and Bromwich 
briefly comment on the impact of mental disorder law on people’s lived 
experiences, noting that “[i]nsanity matters much less now in Canada 
because the plea’s outcome most just affects the place and style of 
incarceration.”175 They also identify criticisms of “[t]he supposed link 
between mental illness and anti-social behaviour.”176 Rather than diving 
into the details of these criticisms, Mitchell and Bromwich refer readers 
to further readings. 
Saunders’ critical approach is similarly pursued in the Pickard 
and Abell casebooks. These casebooks also employ interdisciplinary 
perspectives—particularly those that point out law’s injustices and power 
imbalances—and teach criminal law in its social, political, institutional, 
and historical contexts. Like the editors of Saunders, the editors of these 
casebooks are also candid about their critical political commitments.
to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Ottawa: Social Science and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada, 1983).
173. Saunders, supra note 18 at 55.
174. Ibid.
175. Ibid at 725.
176. Ibid at 726.
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3. Beginning with “people’s lives”: Pickard
Pickard was first published in 1992 and most recently published in 
2002. The casebook shows that lived experience is relevant to studying 
criminal law. Pickard’s approach is distinctive among Canadian criminal 
law casebooks in its engagement with the multiplicity of first-hand 
perspectives that are relevant to the study and practice of criminal law, 
particularly a study and practice that aspires “to imagine a good criminal 
justice system—one that can be, despite its coercive nature, effective and 
humane.”177 The book seems to aim to pay heightened attention to lived 
experience in order to work towards social justice through criminal law. 
Pickard uses both doctrine and critique to develop better students and 
future lawyers. The editors’ conception of “better” involves the ability to 
think reflectively:
In the end, it is enough if students are better able to think reflectively 
about the legal arguments they are learning to fashion…[P]rofessional 
training requires the ability to handle the future with intelligence rooted 
in a full grasp of essential doctrine and sensitivity toward those features 
of our legal and political culture that are driving forces for change in that 
doctrine.178
With respect to their social justice commitment, Pickard’s editors 
expressly set out to teach students how to make politically informed use 
of doctrine and how to understand the doctrine’s political context. The 
editors explain in their preface:
We want these materials to help people learn three things: (1) how to 
make criminal law arguments from within the self-enclosed world of 
doctrinal logic; (2) how to recognize the ways those arguments speak 
both from and into a complex political context; and (3) how to articulate 
politically informed legal arguments that have communicative power in 
legal culture as well as the possibility of contributing to social justice in 
this country.179
Toni Pickard and Phil Goldman first articulated these goals in the 
preface to the first edition.180 In the preface to the first edition, Pickard 
and Goldman explain that they bring together doctrine and materials 
from popular culture,181 empirical analysis,182 and the academic fields of 
177. Pickard, supra note 18 at xxi.
178. Ibid at xxii-xxiii. See also Toni Pickard & Phil Goldman, Dimensions of Criminal Law (Toronto: 
Emond Montgomery, 1992) at xxiii-xxiv.
179. Pickard, supra note 18 at xxi. 
180. Ibid.
181. Ibid.
182. Ibid at xxiii.
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“sociology, criminology, political science, feminist jurisprudence, and 
social theory.”183 By including a range of interdisciplinary materials, 
Pickard and Goldman pursue a critique-inspired approach that involves 
teaching readers to be aware of, to appreciate, and to potentially work with 
the multiple perspectives that are relevant to criminal law. 
In the most recent edition, the first part of the book, “Human 
Dimensions,” deals with people whom the law labels as offenders and 
victims and then with sentencing. The editors’ exploration of “human 
dimensions” at the beginning of the casebook reveals a vision of students 
(and of lawyering) that is in marked contrast to the vision that Stuart 
embraces. Rather than viewing students as having no critical voice before 
they have mastered judicial analysis, and rather than regarding judicial 
analysis and statutory interpretation as the primary tools of criminal 
lawyers, Pickard regards students as coming to law school with a rich 
variety of experiences and knowledges on which they can draw and as 
future lawyers who will need to pay attention to the experiences of the 
people with whom they will work. Pickard thus values non-professionalized 
perspectives, including those of students themselves and those of people 
whom the law categorizes as victims and offenders. 
The first chapter offers glimpses into some of the possible emotional, 
physical, and social experiences of survivors and criminalized people. 
Readers encounter, for example, Bruce Shapiro’s reflective article on 
being “a victim of random violence,”184 in which he observes that rather 
than operating as individualized “fight-or-flight” agents, “in the confusion 
and panic of life-threatening attack, people reached out to one another.”185 
 The second chapter of the casebook, and the final chapter within 
the “Human Dimensions” part, deals with sentencing rules, practices, 
and issues. The editors’ decision to use sentencing as the casebook’s first 
doctrinal component seems to be informed by their vision of lawyers 
as professionals who work not simply with legal rules but also—and 
importantly—with people. The editors focus on sentencing at the beginning 
of the casebook because sentencing “represents the sole experience of the 
process for most people who come into conflict with the law.”186 
183. Ibid at xxii.
184. Bruce Shapiro, “Anatomy of an Assault: A Victim of Random Violence Ponders Our Culture of 
Crime” (July-August 1995), Utne Reader 51-57, adapted from (April 3, 1995), The Nation, reprinted 
in Pickard, supra note 18 at 49. 
185. Ibid at 52 [emphasis in original].
186. Ibid at xxi.
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Readers learn about “[t]he reality of sentencing law” by reading 
case law.187 Yet the editors are careful to show that people’s experiences 
extend beyond the sentencing hearing. For instance, readers learn about 
an incarcerated person’s experience in solitary confinement through an 
excerpt from McCann et al v The Queen et al.188 The excerpt relays the 
evidence given by Andrew Bruce, who had spent time in the British 
Columbia Penitentiary’s solitary confinement unit. Readers learn about 
the size and contents of Bruce’s cell—an 11’2” by 6’6” space containing 
plywood, a thin foam mattress, two blankets and sheets, a foam pillow 
and a pillowcase, a combination toilet/washbowl, an air vent, and a radio 
outlet.189 When describing his time in solitary confinement, Bruce said, 
“You get twisted about it. Your frustration turns to hate towards the guards 
and all the people who keep you there.”190 
Pickard covers the defence of not criminally responsible on account 
of mental disorder in its second part, “Doctrinal Dimensions.” In the 
“Mental Disorder” section, the editors appeal to the reader’s own 
intuitions and perspectives. For example, the editors follow up on cases 
with the following types of questions: “Put yourself in the position of a 
jury member in either the Abbey or Chaulk trial. What questions would 
you ask with respect to the evidence if you were instructed pursuant to 
each of these alternative formulations? Would your decision change? 
Which do you find most appropriate in terms of your personal view of the 
relationship between mental disease and responsibility?”191 The questions 
continue: “Now put yourself in the position of defence counsel. What 
differences do the various tests make in the evidence you would try to 
develop and present?”192 These questions resonate with reflective practice, 
which Michele Leering has conceptualized as “reflection on practice or 
technique (skills), critical (knowledge), and self-reflection (values),” along 
with “reflecting in community” and “becoming an integrated reflective 
practitioner.”193 While an in-depth analysis of reflective practice is beyond 
the scope of this paper, Pickard’s reflective prompts demonstrate that 
reflection is one of the learning outcomes and legal skills that critique-
inspired pedagogies might aim to foster. The method of envisioning the 
187. Pickard, supra note 18 at 130.
188. McCann et al v The Queen et al [1976] 1 FC 570, reprinted in Pickard, supra note 18 at 210.
189. Ibid at 210.
190. Ibid.
191. Pickard, supra note 18 at 617 [emphasis added].
192. Ibid.
193. Michele Leering, “Conceptualizing Reflective Practice for Legal Professionals” (2014) 23 J L & 
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student as a reflective practitioner is at odds with a vision of the lawyer 
as someone who primarily works  with and learns from judicial analysis. 
Reflective practice recognizes that students (and law professionals) bring 
with them an array of knowledges and perspectives and will need to find 
ways to sort through connections and tensions between personal values, 
professional values and practices, norms and rules contained within 
judicial reasons (and conflicts among judicial reasons), and clients’ needs, 
values, and experiences.
Pickard makes a distinct contribution to Canadian criminal law 
casebooks through its attention to lived experience. Pickard, Goldman, 
Mohr, and Cairns-Way demonstrate that criminal law is normative—
it constitutes one perspective that can be significantly at odds with 
individuals’ senses of justice and with individuals’ lived experiences. The 
alignment of criminal law’s normativity with power relations is further 
explored in Abell.
4. “Relations of power”: Abell
In 1993—one year after Pickard entered the market—another critical 
criminal law casebook was published: Jennie Abell and Elizabeth 
Sheehy’s Criminal Law and Procedure: Cases, Context, Critique.194 In 
their introduction to the book, Abell and Sheehy write that the “materials 
have been years in the making, having their impetus…in our political 
commitments and experience as activists and lawyers, our research 
and scholarship, and from five years of interactive teaching with these 
materials at the University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law.”195 
In a book review, Constance Backhouse writes that Abell Volume 
1 “holds the distinction, along with Toni Pickard’s and Phil Goldman’s 
Dimensions of Criminal Law…of belonging to a new genre of criminal 
casebooks.”196 This is a genre committed to teaching criminal law in a 
critical manner by exposing the ways in which criminal law generates and 
reproduces social injustices and inequalities.197 These values have carried 
on through the most recent versions of the two volumes of Abell, published 
in 2012 and 2014.
In the introduction to the first edition of the first volume, Abell and 
Sheehy discuss current events in order to illustrate the “tension between 
critical legal education and the dominant understanding of the practice 
194. Jennie Abell & Elizabeth Sheehy, Criminal Law & Procedure: Cases, Context, Critique (North 
York: Captus Press, 1993).
195. Ibid at 2.
196. Constance Backhouse, Book Review of Criminal Law & Procedure: Cases, Context, Critique by 
Jennie Abell & Elizabeth Sheehy, (1995) 10:1 CJLS 213 at 213.
197. Backhouse, supra note 196.
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of law.”198 They describe, in particular, a conflict between the Student 
Legal Aid Society and the criminal defence bar in Ottawa. The Student 
Legal Aid Society had “formed a Women’s Division to address issues 
for women who are victims of violence, and then implemented a policy 
declining representation of men charged with offences of violence against 
their mates.”199 The criminal defence bar was critical of “the policy itself, 
the clinic, the law school and its ‘feminist’ agenda, and the individual 
students,” and carried out measures including: 
…withdrawal of their services from the law school, barring of students 
from remand court, news accounts denouncing the clinic as violating the 
Charter itself, threats that students who had taken ‘Women and the Law’ 
courses would never secure employment with local firms, and petitions 
to the University, the Ontario Legal Aid Plan, and the Law Society of 
Upper Canada to censure the policy or de-fund the clinic.200 
Abell and Sheehy thus illustrate some of the lived experiences facing law 
students, law professors, and lawyers in dealing with the systemic problem 
of violence against women. 
As articulated in the most recent edition, Abell Volume 1 aims to 
develop students’ “broad understanding of the context, nature, and impact 
of the criminal law process in Canada,” while the second volume covers 
“issues of ‘substantive’ criminal law.”201 The two volumes are designed to 
be used together for teaching a first-year criminal law course or to be used 
separately.202 The practices of identifying and critiquing power relations 
lie at the heart of both volumes, with the two volumes demonstrating both 
the limitations and the potential of doctrine for effecting social change. 
In the introduction to the most recent edition of the first volume, 
the editors specifically target a particular group of legal educators and 
students—those ready to engage with criminal law’s systemic problems, 
as well as academics and students who think critically about criminal law 
and practice from outside the lawyer-professional mode.203 Abell, Sheehy, 
and Bakht further describe the first volume as both “a law casebook” and 
“a critique of law.” The book “is…a law casebook, in that it draws on 
traditional legal materials, cases, and legislation to illustrate the theoretical 
points,” and it is also “a critique of law, in that it examines the impact of 
198. Abell & Sheehy, supra note 194 at 2.
199. Ibid.
200. Ibid at 2-3.
201. Abell Volume 1, supra note 18 at 10.
202. Abell Volume 2, supra note 18 at 1.
203. Abell Volume 1, supra note 18 at 2.
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traditional legal doctrine and law-in-practice.”204 The editors employ “the 
themes of feminist analysis, inquiry into colonization, colonialism, and 
racism, and a class-based critique of law to explore the impact of criminal 
law upon women, lesbians, gays, Aboriginal peoples, African-Canadians 
and other racialized people, and the poor, and to probe the interlocking 
relations of power.”205
The editors write that they “remain sceptical about whether it is 
possible to shift relations of power by invoking criminal prosecution or 
liberal notions of ‘rights’ through litigation.”206 They recognize that the 
“The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms…has at least contributed 
to the growing body of jurisprudence exposing inequalities perpetuated 
through law,”207 but they nonetheless seem to refrain from viewing their 
study of criminal law’s systemic biases as serving the primary purpose 
of leading towards a more just internal reworking of criminal law. Such 
a position is in line with the findings of a number of commissions and 
inquiries relating to the criminal justice system’s impacts on Indigenous 
people, which have found that allowing for independent Indigenous legal 
systems to fully exercise their authority will be necessary for bringing an 
end to the mass imprisonment of Indigenous people in Canada.208 
In Abell Volume 2, the editors again rely on a number of themes for the 
purpose of demonstrating criminal law’s effects on marginalized groups of 
people, addressing not only “the themes of feminism, colonization, racism, 
and class-based critique,” but also “issues about the impact of criminal 
law and the criminal justice system upon persons with disabilities and 
upon the LGBT community.”209 In comparison to Volume 1, an effort to 
develop meaningful social change “through law” is expressly indicated. 
In the introduction to Volume 2, the editors write, “[w]e hope this book 
will prove useful for those who are committing to seeking social justice 
through law, whether law students, lawyers, or researchers.”210 The 
book asks students to contemplate questions geared towards honing 
professionalized legal strategies, such as identifying whether cases are 
204. Ibid.
205. Ibid [bold omitted].
206. Ibid.
207. Ibid, citing Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
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consistent with one another,211 and how they might utilize the Charter to 
make legal arguments.212 
While I have pointed out this difference in orientation between the two 
Abell volumes, I do not mean to suggest that the lines are sharply drawn. 
For instance, Abell Volume 1 teaches its readers about criminal procedure 
through the aid of cases involving Charter challenges, and Abell Volume 
2 targets not only law professors and students but also “those who work 
and teach in law-related disciplines such as criminology or sociology.”213 
My impression is that they each have a slightly different emphasis. Abell 
Volume 1 includes doctrinal documents and topics but primarily views 
such contents from a somewhat removed perspective, one that is wary 
of the ability of legal arguments to effect change. Abell Volume 2, while 
applying critical lenses to doctrinal topics, emphasizes how those critical 
lenses can be used to develop a reader’s ability to use the law to carry out 
social change. Together, both volumes demonstrate the difficult balance 
that critique-inspired pedagogies aim to strike between teaching about 
both law’s injustices and law’s potential for remedying injustices.
A novel feature of the Abell collection is its inclusion of a chapter 
on “Colonization and the Imposition of Criminal Law” close to the 
beginning of Volume 1—as chapter two. The chapter addresses “[t]he 
imposition of Canadian criminal law on Aboriginal peoples.”214 Through 
this organization, Abell distinguishes itself from other Canadian criminal 
law casebooks and sets the stage for readers to see criminal law as a 
form of social control that is intimately connected with colonialism. The 
chapter illustrates that the very categories of a crime and of a criminal are 
constructed by Canadian criminal law within a context laden with colonial 
violence against Indigenous people, cultures, and laws.215 
The chapter includes an excerpt from Forrest LaViolette’s The 
Struggle for Survival: Indian Cultures and the Protestant Ethic in British 
Columbia.216 This excerpt includes the Proclamation that Prime Minister 
John A MacDonald made in 1883, which describes the potlatch as “the 
211. Ibid at 176.
212. Ibid at 42.
213. Ibid at 1.
214. Abell Volume 1, supra note 18 at 45.
215. Quince advocates for a similar approach, see Quince, supra note 7 at 165. In its newest edition, 
Roach now includes a brief discussion of “Treaties, Aboriginal Rights, and Indigenous Law” in its first 
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parent of numerous vices which eat out the heart of the people.”217 
LaViolette also includes a petition sent to the Prime Minister from members 
of the Cowichan agency, calling for the repeal of the Indian Act’s clause 
forbidding the Potlatch and explaining the meaning of the dance and its 
lack of harm to others.218
The petition reveals that people participating in activities that the 
Canadian state has decided to label as criminal are also political beings.219 
Here, the signatories vividly asserted their collective social and political 
agency by appealing to the Prime Minister in an effort to reverse the 
criminal law’s encroachment into political activities that “do not injure 
anyone.”220 In their notes, Abell, Sheehy, and Bakht emphasize that 
Canadian law constitutes only one system of law: “[o]utlawing the Potlatch 
did more than drive a ceremonial and cultural practice underground. It 
effectively destroyed the people’s traditional government—they used the 
Potlatch to make law, confer responsibilities and judge wrongdoing, and 
make amends for crimes against the community.”221 Individuals may thus 
be political and legal beings existing within multiple systems of law—
subjected to, creating, and seeking change within them. 
Abell addresses the defence of not criminally responsible on account 
of mental disorder in Volume 2. The “Mental Disorder” section opens 
with a discussion of the legal experiences faced by accused persons living 
with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) or Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder 
(FASD). The focus is on the individuals living with FAS/FASD and their 
families and communities. This is different from Stuart, which is more fully 
organized according to doctrinal concepts, regardless of disproportionate 
impacts on particular groups of people. 
The editors explain that “the issues raised by the…significant limits 
on cognitive capacity [resulting from FAS or FASD] have mainly been 
addressed by the courts in sentencing.”222 Abell, Sheehy, and Bakht further 
teach students that judges can adapt their reasoning to address people’s 
experiences with racialization, colonialism, disability, and discrimination. 
For example, they provide a sentencing case example in which the judge 
refers to an accused’s mother’s testimony with respect to the prevalence of 
FAS in a community:
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“In R v Charlie, 2012 YKTC 5 (a sentencing decision in which the 
accused had pled guilty), Judge Lilles describes the “indisputable link 
between his Aboriginal status and his disability” as revealed by the 
Gladue Report filed in the case…The accused’s mother, now sober, 
suggested that an astounding ‘90 percent of the second generation of 
residential school survivors in Ross River have been impacted with 
FAS’”223
This excerpt provides a lived-experience counterpoint to the more 
dominant reliance on psychiatric evidence that appears in mental disorder 
discussions in the other casebooks. 
Consistent with the theme of contesting entrenched power relations, 
the editors of Abell demonstrate that the prominent constructions of mental 
disorder have been influenced by social, political, and institutional power 
dynamics, and they give significant space to perspectives that challenge 
these dynamics. 
Conclusions: The challenge of pursuing critique-inspired teaching 
instead of doctrine-first teaching
A number of English-language Canadian criminal law casebooks add 
a welcome feature to the Canadian common law teaching landscape: 
all but one of six  recently published casebooks integrate doctrine and 
critique. This flourishing of critique-inspired pedagogies is particularly 
notable when compared to Sandomierski’s study of Canadian contract law 
casebooks, which demonstrate a more entrenched adherence to doctrine-
first teaching. 
The Charter, the systemic injustices that continue to mark criminal 
justice practices, and the human suffering involved in criminal law have all 
likely contributed to fostering this rich collection of critique-inspired texts. 
The texts allude to the Charter’s impact on criminal law, with lawyers and 
judges turning to the expertise of social science scholars.224 Yet, as the texts 
also caution that systemic injustices continue and activism and political 
dialogue continue to serve as important mechanisms for pursuing social 
change.225 Additionally, as an area of law, criminal law attempts to respond 
to immense physical, emotional, relational, and psychological harms, 
while at the same time imposing such harms. For instance, the editors of 
Roach write that when a judge imposes a sentence, “the state is inflicting 
some measure of suffering on an individual in response to wrongdoing.”226 
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This “extraordinary…act”227 of inflicting suffering constitutes a clear, 
visible act of state violence.228 Human suffering is thus at the forefront of 
both criminal law’s subject matter and practices. Moreover, inequalities, 
injustices, and the human suffering involved in other areas of law and social 
policy, such as child protection, often culminate in, or are exacerbated by, 
criminal justice processes.229 This combination of human suffering, the 
invitation to challenge the law through the Charter, and the continued 
oppression of marginalized individuals and groups are likely some of the 
factors that have led editors to reimagine the structure and contents of 
casebooks. 
Despite the prevalence of critique-inspired approaches within criminal 
law casebooks, critique-inspired teaching does not necessarily constitute 
a norm in Canadian criminal law teaching. To the contrary, three of the 
books that most strongly favour critical perspectives—Abell Volume 1, 
Abell Volume 2, and Pickard—have not been published since 2012, 2014, 
and 2002, respectively. Relatedly, in a review of Abell Volume 1, Constance 
Backhouse writes that, although she would have “love[d] to teach with 
[Abell Volume 1]” at the University of Western Ontario’s Faculty of Law, 
she did not.230 After having taught with Pickard for two to three years—
and experiencing significant resistance from students—Backhouse and 
her colleague, Winifred Holland, decided to teach with one of the more 
“traditional casebooks.”231 In their introduction to the first edition of Abell 
Volume 1, Abell and Sheehy similarly describe in detail the challenge of 
incorporating critique into law teaching:
Critical feminist teaching is…challenging because the law school 
community resists a curriculum that challenges antifeminism, racism, 
the centrality of law, and legal education as training for hierarchy. 
Some students engage in racial, sexual, and homophobic harassment 
in and outside of classrooms, and other professors, by eschewing 
“political content” in their courses, reinforce, whether intentionally or 
inadvertently, the notion that a critical curriculum is biased and non-
legal. Similar responses are faced by feminist, critical race theorist, and 
socialist professors in academe generally, but they are exacerbated by 
the context of a “professional school” where the overt agenda is the 
preparation of students to enter the practice of law as it is currently 
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rigidly defined.232
Perhaps, then, the most significant challenge in adopting critique-inspired 
teaching is overcoming the expectations of students, colleagues, and the 
legal profession for doctrine-first teaching. 
I am inspired by the extent to which criminal law casebook editors 
have accepted the challenge of working against the grain by incorporating 
critique into first-year criminal law teaching. The critique-inspired 
casebooks complicate the image of first-year common law education as 
they offer evidence of critical political commitments and pedagogical 
methods within Canadian criminal law education. Given the challenge of 
employing these methods, the books might also provide adaptable tools 
and perspectives for instructors to use. For instance, even if criminal law 
professors choose to use Stuart—the 2018 doctrine-first casebook—the 
sources and perspectives offered in the critique-inspired books provide 
material and reflections that professors might wish to use as further 
reading, questions, or guidance for organizing the structure of their 
courses. Indeed, Backhouse’s teaching approach illustrates one of the 
possibilities for blending doctrine-first materials with critique-inspired 
teaching practices. Specifically, when Backhouse encountered “the 
unprecedented wave of backlash generated by students resistant to critical 
legal textbooks,” she dealt with the resistance not by abandoning critique-
inspired teaching altogether but by instead using one of the “traditional” 
casebooks: “I decided that I could do more to provide a critical learning 
environment in the classroom if I conceded the point, and taught with the 
more traditional text uniformly adopted by my other four criminal law 
colleagues.”233 At the very least, the existence of critique-inspired criminal 
law casebooks has contributed to throwing into question the legitimacy 
and stability of doctrine-first teaching. The casebooks show that teaching 
with critical perspectives does not have to simply be an aspiration among 
first-year common law teachers. 
In light of the pushback imposed by doctrine-first expectations, I 
propose that one path towards building a stronger foundation for critique-
inspired teaching involves emphasizing and further exploring the goals 
of critique-inspired teaching—developing better lawyers and valuing 
student diversity. First, the clear articulation of these goals establishes why 
critique-inspired pedagogies are valuable. Second, the identification of 
such goals lays the groundwork for further research into whether critique-
232. Abell & Sheehy, supra note 194 at 2.
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inspired pedagogies relate, in practice, to the student learning outcomes, 
future lawyering skills, and student experiences that the pedagogies aim 
to foster.234 Third, an emphasis on the goals of critique-inspired teaching 
assists in finding common ground among legal academics. As Sandomierski 
demonstrates, many common law contracts professors who adopt doctrine-
first teaching nonetheless aspire to achieve the goal of using critique to 
enhance and broaden students’ skills. This shared aim suggests that there 
may be extensive interest in shifting more resolutely towards critique-
inspired teaching, despite the broader pressures to maintain doctrine-first 
approaches. If professors capitalize on this seemingly pervasive aspiration 
to instill critical capacities in students, they might be able to dismantle 
some of the doctrine-first pressures. 
The goal of valuing student diversity is less expressly articulated in 
the casebooks in my study. However, Abell and Sheehy offer a glimpse of 
this aim in their above description of the dilemma facing professors who 
aspire to teach critical feminist perspectives. In detailing the obstacles 
facing those who choose to teach critical perspectives, Abell and Sheehy 
indirectly illuminate the marginalized experiences of students, professors, 
lawyers, and clients whose values and knowledges fall outside the dominant 
legal and law school discourses. At the same time as people express 
pejorative remarks, there will be students, professors, and clients who feel 
unwelcome and disregarded. And at the same time as judicial analyses are 
presented as neutral and objective, worldviews and experiences that land 
outside those frameworks will be regarded as biased. 
The aims of listening to and valuing diverse experiences inside and 
outside the classroom are mutually constitutive—they both involve a vision 
of students and lawyers who are respectful of difference, who recognize 
colonial violence in Canadian law, and who identify spaces to argue for 
social justice within and outside of Canadian law. The factors that create 
pressures against critique-inspired pedagogies thus simultaneously reflect 
reasons for pursuing them, and the critique-inspired criminal law casebooks 
helpfully contribute to showing that critique-inspired pedagogies can be 
pursued in law school classrooms.
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